



Software Verification

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ETH Zürich, Fall 2014

Aims of the course

Introduction to issues of software quality

Lecturers: Bertrand Meyer, Carlo Furia, Sebastian Nanz Assistant: Chris Poskitt

Webpage: http://se.inf.ethz.ch/courses/2014b_fall/sv/

Monday lectures 10-12, RZ F21 Classical lecture

Wednesday lecture (14-15, RZ F21): Variable slot: seminar by guest, or extra lecture

Exercise session: Wednesday, 15-17, RZ F21

To present available techniques for ensuring better software quality

Axiomatic semantics Separation logic Assertion inference Auto-active verification

Static analysis Abstract interpretation

Model checking Real-time systems

Testing

Program proofs

Program analysis

Model checking

Testing

Julian Tschannen (AutoProof)

Chris Poskitt (weakest preconditions; separation logic)

Đurica Nikolić (static analysis / JULIA)

Alexey Kolesnichenko (AutoTest)

Kaue Soares da Silveira, Google (Testing at Google)

Project: 30% Written exam (Monday 15th December): 70%

All material considered during <u>regular lecture slots</u> and <u>exercise classes</u> is examinable

A problem has been detected and Windows has been shut down to prevent damage to your computer.

The problem seems to be caused by the following file: SPCMDCON.SYS

PAGE_FAULT_IN_NONPAGED_AREA

If this is the first time you've seen this Stop error screen, restart your computer. If this screen appears again, follow these steps:

Check to make sure any new hardware or software is properly installed. If this is a new installation, ask your hardware or software manufacturer for any Windows updates you might need.

If problems continue, disable or remove any newly installed hardware or software. Disable BIOS memory options such as caching or shadowing. If you need to use Safe Mode to remove or disable components, restart your computer, press F8 to select Advanced Startup Options, and then select Safe Mode.

Technical information:

*** STOP: 0x00000050 (0xFD3094C2,0x00000001,0xFBFE7617,0x00000000)

*** SPCMDCON.SYS - Address FBFE7617 base at FBFE5000, DateStamp 3d6dd67c

Overview of software verification

- A set of policies and activities to:
 - > Define quality objectives
 - Help ensure that software products and processes meet these objectives
 - > Assess to what extent they do
 - > Improve them over time

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The Quality Assurance activity devoted to enforcing quality, in particular:

- Detecting deviations from quality
- Correcting them


Common distinction ("V & V"):

- Validation: assessment of any product relative to its specification ("checking that it is doing the right things")
- Verification: assessment of internal quality ("checking that it is doing things right")

In this course, "Verification" covers both

Quality is the absence of "deficiencies" (or "bugs").

More precise terminology (IEEE):



For this discussion, a failure is any event of system execution that violates a stated quality objective

A priori techniques

Build system for quality; e.g.: process approaches, proof-guided construction, Design by Contract

A posteriori techniques

> Static: from software text only

- Program proofs
- Program analysis / abstract interpretation
- Model checking
- > Dynamic: execute software
 - Testing

External factors: visible to customers

(not just end users but e.g. purchasers)

Examples : ease of use, extendibility, timeliness

Internal factors: perceptible only to developers

Examples : good programming style, information hiding, documentation

Only external factors count in the end, but the internal factors make it possible to obtain them.

Product: properties of the resulting software

For example: correctness, efficiency

Process: properties of the procedures used to produce and "maintain" the software

Some external factors

Product quality (immediate):

➢ Reliability
➢ Efficiency
➢ Ease of use
➢ Ease of learning

Product quality (long term): > Extendibility > Reusability > Portability

Process quality:

- Production speed (timeliness)
- Cost-effectiveness
- Predictability
- > Reproducibility
- Self-improvement

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
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Correctness: The systems' ability to perform according to specification, in cases covered by the specification

Robustness:

The systems' ability to perform reasonably in cases not covered by the specification


Security: The systems' ability to protect itself against hostile use




NIST report on testing (May 2002)

Financial consequences, on developers and users, of "insufficient testing infrastructure"

\$ 59.5 B.



Software projects according to Standish



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Ariane 5 Therac Patriot London Ambulance System Mars Orbiter Vehicle Buffer overflows

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Mars Climate Orbiter

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Mishap Investigation Board

Phase I Report

November 10, 1999

Mars Polar Lander

Cruise

- RCS attitude control
- Four trajectory correction maneuvers, Site Adjustment maneuver 9/1/99, Contingency maneuver up to Entry – 7 hr.
- 11 Month Cruise
- Near-simultaneous tracking w/ Mars Climate Orbiter or MGS during approach

Entry, Descent, and Landing

- Arrival 12/3/99
- Jettison Cruise Stage
- Microprobes sep. from Cruise Stage

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
- Hypersonic Entry (6.9 km/s)
- Parachute Descent
- Propulsive Landing
- Descent Imaging [MARDI]

Launch

- Delta 7425
- Launch 1/3/99
- 576 kg Launch Mass


Landed Operations

- 76° S Latitude, 195° W Longitude
- Ls 256 (Southern Spring)
- 60–90 Day Landed Mission
- MVACS, LIDAR Science
- Data relay via Mars Climate Orbiter or MGS
- Commanding via Mars Climate Orbiter or direct-to-Earth high–gain antenna



The problem

On September 27, 1999, the operations navigation team consulted with the spacecraft engineers to discuss navigation discrepancies regarding velocity change (ΔV) modeling issues. On September 29, 1999, it was discovered that the small forces ΔV 's reported by the spacecraft engineers for use in orbit determination solutions was low by a factor of 4.45 (1 pound force=4.45 Newtons) because the impulse bit data contained in the AMD file was delivered in lb-sec instead of the specified and expected units of Newton-sec.



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37 seconds into flight, exception in Ada program not processed; order given to abort mission. Loss estimated to \$10 billion.

Exception was caused by an incorrect conversion: a 64-bit real value was incorrectly translated into a 16-bit integer.

Systematic analysis had "proved" that the exception could not occur - the 64-bit value ("horizontal bias" of the flight) was proved to be always representable as a 16-bit integer ! It was a REUSE error:

> The analysis was correct - for Ariane 4 !

> The assumption was documented - in a design document !

See Jean-Marc Jézéquel & Bertrand Meyer, "Design by Contract: The Lessons of Ariane, IEEE *Computer*, January 1997, available at <u>se.ethz.ch/~meyer/publications/computer/ariane.pdf</u>


Security example: the buffer overflow

System expects some input from an external user:

First name:	
Last name:	
Address:	

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from i := 1 until
     i > input_size
loop
     buffer [i] := input [i]
     i := i + 1
end
```



Getting the input

from i := 1 until
 i > input_size or i > buffer_size
loop
 buffer [i] := input [i]
 i := i + 1

end

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Verification in the software lifecycle

Quality assurance techniques

Process Product Tool-supported Manual Technology-generic Phase-generic **Product-generic** VS Build (a priori) Static Dynamic Informal Partial Complete

Technology-specific *Phase-specific* (analysis, design, implementation...) Product-specific (code, documentation...) Assess (a posteriori) Mathematical

"Software" is not just code!

Quality affects code, documentation, design, analysis, management, the software process, and the software quality policy itself.

Most of the techniques presented will, however, be for code.

Process-based approaches to quality assurance

Lifecycle models

Process models: CMMI, ISO 9001:2000

> Inspections

> Open-source process

> eXtreme Programming (XP)